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FIGHTING FREESTYLE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 
FAIRNESS, AND CORPORATE REPUTATION 
Rebecca Tushnet* 
Abstract: There are three distinct groups who might want to engage in 
speech about commercial entities or to constrain those commercial enti-
ties from making particular claims of their own. Competitors may sue 
each other for false advertising, consumers may sue businesses, and gov-
ernment regulators may impose requirements on what businesses must 
and may not say. In this context, this Article will evaluate a facially persua-
sive but ultimately misguided claim about corporate speech: that because 
consumers regularly get to say nasty things about corporations under the 
lax standards governing defamation of public figures, corporations must 
be free to make factual claims subject only to defamation-type restrictions 
on intentionally false statements. The premise that this would further 
equality ignores the overall structure of advertising law, in which consum-
ers cannot be equated to advertisers, competitors are already on equal 
footing with one another, and the government as regulator is not sup-
posed to be on equal footing with anyone. 
Introduction 
 Who gets to criticize corporations, and under what terms? This 
Article considers one aspect of the problem: the fact that there are 
three distinct groups who might want to engage in speech about com-
mercial entities or to constrain those commercial entities from making 
particular claims of their own. Competitors may sue each other for false 
advertising under the Lanham Act and parallel state unfair competition 
laws, consumers may sue businesses using state consumer protection 
laws and common-law claims, and government regulators may impose 
requirements on what businesses must and may not say. This tripartite 
structure must be kept in mind when evaluating First Amendment con-
straints on any one of the types of regulation. In particular, arguments 
that consumer-plaintiff suits need to be reassessed to preserve freedom 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2009, Rebecca Tushnet, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to 
participants at the Boston College Law School Symposium. Bruce Keller of Debevoise & 
Plimpton kindly allowed me to use his excellent forthcoming treatise on false advertising 
law for research purposes. As always, special thanks to Mark Tushnet. 
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of commercial speech must consider the implications for the other bo-
dies of law. 
 In this context, I will evaluate a facially persuasive, but ultimately 
misguided claim about corporate speech: that because consumers regu-
larly get to say nasty things about corporations under the lax standards 
governing defamation of public figures, corporations must be free to 
make factual claims subject only to defamation-type restrictions on in-
tentionally false statements—essentially, common-law fraud. The prem-
ise that this would put corporations on equal footing with consumers 
ignores the overall structure of advertising law, in which consumers 
cannot be equated to advertisers, competitors are already on equal 
footing with one another, and the government as regulator is not sup-
posed to be on equal footing with anyone. 
 The interaction between the three regulatory regimes has not 
been much recognized, in part because false commercial speech cur-
rently receives no constitutional protection. Courts have occasionally 
evaluated whether findings by the Federal Trade Commission (the 
“FTC”) are consistent with the First Amendment, but have put few lim-
its on the FTC.1 Likewise, the only courts to consider whether the First 
Amendment ought to impose restrictions on basic Lanham Act false 
advertising claims have rejected free speech claims.2 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, a 
putative consumer class action, was the first real attempt to apply First 
Amendment restraints to private consumer protection law at the na-
tional level.3 It was not a success, but it came closer than the others, in 
part because of a fairness argument unavailable in the other two con-
texts. 
I. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky and Consumer Protection Law 
 Beginning in 1996, Nike was targeted by protesters claiming that 
the company, via its subcontractors, underpaid and abused workers in 
developing countries.4 Nike launched a public relations counteroffen-
                                                                                                                      
1 E.g., Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 321 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a First Amend-
ment challenge to an FTC finding of deception that was not based on evidence of actual 
consumer deception). 
2 E.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 939 
(3d Cir. 1990) (holding that heightened First Amendment scrutiny did not apply to Lan-
ham Act claims against television ads touting the superiority of one health insurer over 
another). 
3 See 539 U.S. 654, 657–65 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in the dismissal of the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted). 
4Id. at 656. 
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sive, including letters to the editor, press releases, letters to college 
presidents who controlled lucrative athletic contracts, and so on.5 
Nike’s communications discussed general issues of globalization, sug-
gesting that what looked exploitative from outside was welcomed by 
workers in developing areas, and also specifically defended the treat-
ment of its subcontractors’ workers.6 Marc Kasky believed that Nike was 
not telling the truth in those claims, so he sued, as California law then 
allowed him to do.7 
 Although lower courts dismissed Kasky’s complaint on the ground 
that Nike’s speech was fully protected by the First Amendment, a di-
vided California Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nike’s state-
ments about its labor practices—in press releases, letters to universities 
which had contracts with Nike, paid “advertorials,” and letters to the 
editor—were commercial speech.8 The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide whether Nike’s statements were commercial speech 
and, if so, whether the First Amendment allowed California to em-
power private attorneys general to sue for damages without having suf-
fered personal injury when the speech was part of a public debate.9 Un-
fortunately for Nike, the Court ultimately dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted because of underlying procedural 
difficulties, and did not decide the questions presented, though two 
justices would have found that the First Amendment protected Nike’s 
speech.10 
 The Court’s 2003 decision in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky could have been a 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan for consumer class actions.11 When the 
Court first applied the First Amendment to defamation in the latter 
case, it had a number of reasons to be sympathetic to the defendant— 
the underlying message sought racial equality; the defendant was a 
public official; the jury was most likely biased; the falsehoods were 
small, immaterial parts of the overall message; and the newspaper was 
not in a position to verify every jot and tittle of every ad.12 
 Likewise, several aspects of Kasky combined to make the plaintiff’s 
claim troubling. Nike had faced a well-organized campaign determined 
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. 
6 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002) (4-3 decision). 
7 Kasky, 539 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J.). 
8 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262. 
9 Kasky, 539 U.S. at 657 (Stevens, J.). 
10 Id. at 657–58, id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting in the dismissal of the writ of certiorari 
as improvidently granted). 
11 See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
12 See id. at 256–64. 
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to make its labor practices a matter of public controversy, and had been 
seeking to defend itself when it spoke out.13 California law, like the fed-
eral Lanham Act and most state consumer protection laws, lacks any 
scienter requirement: perfectly good-faith errors, if false, can lead to 
liability.14 In addition, California’s standing requirement for consumer 
suits was minimal at best.15 Kasky had never bought a pair of Nike 
shoes, which makes his harm from Nike’s alleged misstatements a bit 
hard to identify.16 California law turned everyone into a private attor-
ney general, increasing an advertiser’s uncertainty about what it could 
say without fear of getting sued.17 (California subsequently amended 
the law to add a standing requirement that will preclude future Kaskys 
from acting as class plaintiffs.18) 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248. 
14 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 2008). 
15 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (West 1997) (amended 2008). 
16 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575). 
17 The concern for the speech-suppressive effects of private attorney general actions is 
comprehensively analyzed—and refuted—in Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General 
and the First Amendment, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 589, 675 (2005). The Solicitor General of the 
United States filed a brief supporting Nike, though attempting to distinguish California’s 
law from the various and sundry federal laws, including the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, regulating false and misleading speech. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 899100, at *14–21 [herein-
after Brief of the U.S.]. 
As a practical matter, we can expect more litigation, and thus more of a speech-
deterrent effect, when anyone with a grudge and a willingness to risk the expense can 
litigate compared to a regime that forces the government, with its always limited resources, 
to pick and choose what advertising to assail. But by First Amendment logic a cause of 
action unsound in private hands is at least equally so in government hands. The Solicitor 
General suggested that the government was more appropriate as a plaintiff—bringing to 
mind the once-serious phrase Ronald Reagan mocked, “I’m from the government and I’m 
here to help you” —but, unsurprisingly, found little support in the case law for this propo-
sition. See, e.g., id. at *7 (arguing that “[t]he government’s enforcement powers are con-
strained by statutory and institutional limitations that avoid intrusions on protected 
speech” as compared to the illegitimate breadth of California’s private cause of action); id. 
at *18 (“[T]he institutional checks on government enforcement provide ample protection 
for protected speech. . . . Because the government has exclusive authority to prosecute 
false advertising, because its prosecutions must meet materiality standards, and because it 
has limited resources to prosecute consumer fraud, federal officials must exercise their 
discretion so as to select for prosecution those cases that represent the best use of public 
resources. Unlike private parties, federal officials are politically accountable for their deci-
sions.”). In fact, the only citation the brief offered for this argument was a “cf.” to Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999)—an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity case, 
not a First Amendment case. Id. at *18. 
18 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (West 2008). A few existing state laws still relax the 
traditional standing requirements, as California’s did. Colorado, Illinois, and Kansas also 
do not require a showing of injury and causation as a precondition for a private action. See 
Col. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-113 (2008); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510/3 (West 2008) (private 
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 Kasky seemed to many to exemplify the strongest case for First 
Amendment limits on false advertising law. Unfortunately, some of the 
most intuitively persuasive arguments for Nike provide no distinction 
between Kasky’s claims and those of any other false advertising plaintiff, 
or the government regulating drug claims or securities filings.19 For 
example, Nike pressed hard on the argument that the conditions of 
production of its shoes were not legitimate subjects of commercial 
speech regulation, because consumers could only have a legitimate in-
terest in whether the goods or services met advertised physical stan-
dards.20 Yet advertising law pervasively, for good reason, regulates ad-
vertisers’ speech about nonphysical attributes even when the conditions 
of production do not affect the cost, quality, or functions of the result-
ing goods or services.21 
                                                                                                                      
action for injunctive relief without proof of damage); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-634 (2005) 
(consumer aggrieved by violation may bring an action, whether or not entitled to dam-
ages). Relatedly, some states do not require proof that consumers relied on the deceptive 
advertising for their claim to succeed. See, e.g., Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc., 636 
A.2d 1383, 1388 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (no showing of individual reliance required); cf. In 
re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 39–41 (Cal. 2009) (holding that, in a class action concern-
ing a long-term ad campaign, the reliance requirement does not require an individualized 
showing of reliance on specific misrepresentations, and reliance can be presumed from 
material falsehood). 
19 Oral argument featured several questions from the Justices asking how an opinion 
could be written to distinguish the communications Nike sent from other types of advertis-
ing that the Justices agreed ought to remain regulated. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 16, at 11–13, 26, 49–50 (asking petitioners and respondent to distinguish 
Kasky’s situation from that of the FTC). Likewise, the United States, though it took Nike’s 
side, argued that it was only the unlimited nature of citizen standing under California’s 
law, along with the supposedly unconstrained remedies that the law afforded, that made 
the lawsuit problematic—not any other issue related to commercial speech. See Brief for 
the U.S., supra note 17, at 20–30. 
20 Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 6–11, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 
1922453. This position attracted the endorsement of a number of amici, as well as Justice 
Brown in her dissent from the California Supreme Court’s decision: 
[S]uch an accommodation could permit states to bar all false or misleading 
representations about the characteristics of a product or service—i.e., the effi-
cacy, quality, value, or safety of the product or service—without justification 
even if these characteristics have become a public issue. In such a situation, the 
governmental interest in protecting consumers from fraud is especially strong 
because these representations address the fundamental questions asked by 
every consumer when he or she makes a buying decision: does the product or 
service work well and reliably, is the product or service harmful and is the 
product or service worth the cost? . . . By contrast, the governmental interest in 
protecting against consumer fraud is less strong if the representations are unre-
lated to the characteristics of the product or service. 
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 280 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
21 See, e.g., Brief for the U.S., supra note 17, at 27–29. 
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 Conditions of product production that make a difference to con-
sumers include “Made in America,”22 “EPA approved,”23 “dolphin-safe 
tuna,”24 “Union Made,” “shade-grown coffee,” “organic,” “cruelty-free,”25 
“rBST-free/hormone-free,”26 and many others. Some consumers con-
sider general corporate behavior relevant to purchasing decisions, even 
when it has nothing to do with the production process.27 Likewise, the 
FTC regulates product endorsements by celebrities and other authori-
ties, even though they often have no connection with product character-
istics, because the FTC believes that endorsement matters to consum-
ers.28 Courts will enjoin commercials that falsely claim that one shampoo 
beat another in a consumer preference test, no matter how good the 
shampoo is.29 Fundamentally, if the protection of consumers’ interests 
in getting what they think they’re getting is not a sufficient government 
interest to suppress speech, we will have to get rid of rather a lot of regu-
lation, including a healthy chunk of trademark law (for goods of equiva-
lent quality). 
 Nor is regulation of truthfulness of production claims difficult to 
justify on consumer protection grounds. As Douglas Kysar has persua-
sively articulated, distinguishing matters that consumers can legitimately 
care about from those that are irrational is inconsistent with a basic 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Complying with the Made in the USA Standard (1998), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus03.pdf; Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Enforcement Policy Statement on U.S. Origin Claims (1997), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/1997/12/epsmadeusa.htm. Research suggests that this claim influences a 
substantial number of purchasers. See C. Min Han, The Role of Consumer Patriotism in the Choice 
of Domestic Versus Foreign Products, J. Advertising Res., June/July 1988, at 25, 28–31; John S. 
Hulland, The Effects of Country-of-Brand and Brand Name on Product Evaluation and Consideration: 
A Cross-Country Comparison, J. Int’l Consumer Mktg., Issue 1 1999, at 23, 23; cf. Gillian Sulli-
van Mort & Matthew Duncan, “Owned By . . .”: Country of Origin’s New Cue, J. Int’l Consumer 
Mktg., Issue 3 2003, at 49, 61–64 (finding that “owned by” country of origin labels had inde-
pendent effects on consumer evaluations distinct from “made in” labels). 
23 See Performance Indus. Inc. v. Koos Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (E.D. Pa. 
1990) (“In today’s environmentally conscious world, [false claims regarding EPA approval] 
are serious misrepresentations. Consumers these days seem to favor products that are envi-
ronmentally benign and to disdain those that are environmentally harsh.”). 
24 See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (defin-
ing “dolphin safe” and making it unlawful to deceptively claim “dolphin safe” status). 
25 See Delcianna J. Winders, Note, Combining Reflexive Law and False Advertising Law to 
Standardize “Cruelty-Free” Labeling of Cosmetics, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 454, 458–59 (2006). 
26 See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Mislead-
ingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy L.A. L. Rev. 227, 244–45 (2007). 
27 See Lois A. Mohr & Deborah J. Webb, The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Price on Consumer Responses, 39 J. Consumer Aff. 121, 142 (2005). 
28 See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009). 
29 See Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1981). 
2009] Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, and Corporate Reputation 1463 
premise of advertising regulation, which is that consumers should be 
able to fulfill their preferences (or have their preferences changed by 
truthful claims).30 Getting rid of all the regulations mentioned in the 
previous paragraph might be satisfactory to believers in a strong, liber-
tarian First Amendment. But for libertarians, the product characteris-
tics/conditions of production division makes even less sense. What is a 
product characteristic? Consumers are probably better suited to deter-
mining that than courts. If consumers find information relevant to 
their purchase decisions, then there is no non-paternalistic reason to 
disregard their preferences. Ironically, the product/process distinction, 
although superficially attractive as a means of limiting the scope of false 
advertising law, is far more regulatory at heart than a blanket prohibi-
tion on misleading consumers because it requires the government to 
decide what consumers should legitimately care about. Modern con-
sumer protection law has gone in the opposite direction: giving con-
sumers a satisfactory product doesn’t make up for deceiving them to 
close the sale, as the Supreme Court has held.31 
 Consumer protection is about more than consumer health, safety, 
or even pocketbooks. It includes consumers’ interest in getting what 
they paid for, be it cruelty-free beauty products or low-calorie ice cream, 
regardless of whether their preferences are rational or not.32 Even the 
value-free rationales of law and economics recognize this: products 
touted as made by well-paid and well-treated workers can command a 
price premium, as can other goods claiming some moral superiority to 
standard production processes. Allowing deception about conditions of 
production distorts the market and disadvantages truthful sellers who 
do produce non-sweatshop goods.33 A market that cannot support a 
                                                                                                                      
30 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 540, 569 (2004). 
31 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965). 
32 See, e.g., id. at 387 (“[T]he public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the 
choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance.”) (internal quo-
tation and citation omitted); JR Tobacco of Am., Inc. v. Davidoff of Geneva (CT), Inc., 957 
F. Supp. 426, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Although the broader context—the current trends 
within the cigar market—reveals that perhaps a number of people smoke cigars for sheerly 
cosmetic reasons and may very well be unable to distinguish a Cuban Cohiba from a JR 
Alternative, this cannot excuse the falsity of the statements contained in JR’s brochure.”); 
Peabody v. P.J.’s Auto Vill., Inc., 569 A.2d 460, 461–62 (Vt. 1989) (where consumer would 
not have purchased a car had she known that it was made by welding the front of a 1974 
Saab to the back of a 1972 Saab, the representation that the car was a 1974 Saab was a ma-
terial misrepresentation under Vermont law even though it had no undesirable effects on 
reliability, safety, or fair market value). 
33 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Me-
chanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488, 495–96 (1970). 
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price premium for more carefully produced goods may then pressure 
producers to cut corners in worker safety or environmental sensitivity, 
producing the health and safety harms that consumers were trying to 
avoid subsidizing through their purchases. In the end, the prod-
uct/process distinction simply cannot help distinguish Kasky from stan-
dard advertising cases, either on theoretical or functional grounds. 
 Relatedly, Nike’s defenders suggested that product characteristics 
are more readily verifiable by an advertiser than conditions of manufac-
ture in our modern, subcontractor economy, and thus it was unjustified 
to apply strict liability to an advertiser’s misstatements about conditions 
of production.34 This, too, cannot be the law because it does not fit the 
facts. Some product characteristics are almost impossible to verify, such 
as the absolute and relative performances of analgesics, a topic that has 
generated decades of litigation among the competitors and the FTC.35 
Some conditions of manufacture and production are simple to verify, 
such as the type of net used to catch fish or the place a computer was 
assembled.36 Yet courts routinely apply the Lanham Act, and the FTC 
                                                                                                                      
34 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. of Am. in 
Support of Petitioners at 12–17, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835350 [here-
inafter Brief of the Chamber of Commerce]; Brief of Amici Curiae the Ass’n of Nat’l Ad-
ver., Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners at 10–22, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 
WL 835112 [hereinafter Brief of the Ass’n of Nat’l Adver.]. 
35 See generally Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984); Bristol-Myers 
Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J. 1994); Am. 
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Upjohn Co. v. 
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 598 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ab-
bott Labs., 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 
501 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963), aff’d, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); In re Novartis Corp., No. 9279, 1999 WL 33913005 
(F.T.C. May 13, 1999), aff’d, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Litigation over the best treat-
ment for heartburn has likewise produced an entire subfield of false advertising law. See 
generally Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. 
Co., 290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002); Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Glaxo Warner-Lambert OTC 
G.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 935 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Con-
sumer Pharms. Co., No. 95 Civ. 7011 (HB), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7257, (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 
1996); SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Con-
sumer Pharms. Co., 906 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 100 F.3d 943 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(table). 
36 Whether the net is really bad for dolphins, or whether a preference for goods made 
in the U.S. is legitimate, are separate questions. The answers may be probabilistic or de-
pendent on moral judgments. But the underlying fact being advertised is not itself hard to 
confirm or deny. 
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continues to regulate, in such circumstances, and the Food and Drug 
Administration (the “FDA”) imposes stringent requirements on diffi-
cult-to-prove drug claims even as the underlying scientific evidence 
changes rapidly.37 
 There were numerous other arguments for Nike in the case, but 
they all had similar troubles; accepting any one of them would have 
thrown significant aspects of the modern advertising regulatory appara-
tus into doubt. In the end, the reasons offered for why this case was spe-
cial cannot distinguish core false advertising cases. Because false adver-
tising law has strong historical, moral, and utilitarian justifications, the 
costs of First Amendment invalidation of a large chunk of false advertis-
ing law would have been quite high.38 This, in the end, was most likely 
why Nike failed to get the Supreme Court to intervene on its behalf 
against California’s consumer protection law, and why false advertising 
law offers a useful perspective from which to examine the continuing 
appeal of treating commercial speech as a distinct class of speech subject 
to regulation, particularly regulation that protects consumers. 
 This dynamic, in which an apparently marginal case actually raises 
issues going to the core of modern regulation of the commercial mar-
ketplace, is highlighted by a specific argument made by Nike: it was un-
fair that Nike’s critics could say almost anything, subject only to the lax 
constraints of defamation law, while Nike’s responses were subject to 
strict liability for falsehood.39 
II. Off-Sides: Equality and Falsity 
 Nike’s main claim was that its letters were not commercial speech 
but political speech, whose truth or falsity was therefore not a matter 
for governmental determination.40 The commercial/political divide 
clearly produces hard cases when a for-profit entity weighs in on a mat-
ter of public interest with an opinion that just happens to coincide with 
                                                                                                                      
37 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192–93 (2009) (discussing imposed FDA 
requirements); Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham, 583 F. Supp. 2d 553, 557–60 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(discussing FDA labeling of new drugs). 
38 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
562–64 (1980) (explaining the informational function of advertising and how false infor-
mation can be banned); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 761–65 (1976) (discussing societal interest in the free flow of commercial 
information). 
39 See Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 28–31, Kasky, 45 P.3d 243 (No. S087859), 
2000 WL 1508256. 
40 See Brief for Petitioners at 21–37, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-
575), 2003 WL 898993. 
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its private interest.41 This private-public collision produced a particular 
argument about inequality in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 
 From Nike’s perspective, one significant problem with calling its 
speech commercial was its effect on the balance between Nike and its 
critics. When antiglobalization forces condemn Nike for its labor prac-
tices, such speech—concededly noncommercial—is subject only to gen-
eral libel laws, with their heightened standards of proof for speech di-
rected against public figures, as Nike surely is. Absent malicious lies, 
Nike can’t silence the protesters. But under Kasky, Nike’s response, if 
targeted to the consumers on whom it depends for economic survival, is 
commercial speech and must be truthful—as determined by a court— 
or Nike may be liable for large sums of money.42 One side gets to fight 
freestyle while the other is limited to Marquis of Queensberry rules, to 
use Justice Scalia’s memorable analogy.43 This position ties into Kenneth 
Karst’s reconceptualization of equality as a fundamental principle of the 
First Amendment:44 apparently, two speakers—equal by virtue of being 
on opposite sides of an argument—are treated differently based on 
                                                                                                                      
41 False advertising cases increasingly confront similar issues. See, e.g., Procter & Gam-
ble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 552 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that Amway distributor 
spreading rumor that a competitor supported Satanism may have engaged in commercial 
speech, notwithstanding the fact that religious discussion is protected by the First Amend-
ment); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1120–21 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that advertiser’s letter to customers stating that its competitor’s product posed 
a health risk was commercial speech, which “need not originate solely from economic mo-
tives”); Birthright v. Birthright, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1138–39 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding 
that advertising that misrepresented how donations to a nonprofit were used was action-
able under the Lanham Act); Marcus v. Jewish Nat’l Fund (Keren Kayemeth Leisrael), Inc., 
557 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (App. Div. 1990) (same result under New York law); cf. United We 
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90–91, 93 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(applying trademark law to the names of competing political parties and finding action-
able confusion despite First Amendment defense). 
42 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 259 (Cal. 2002). 
43 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (holding that, by banning only 
certain types of fighting words, targeting racist but not anti-racist speakers, a city violated 
the First Amendment, and that “St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a de-
bate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules”). 
This pithy sentence from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion understandably showed up in 
the Kasky briefs. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 34, 
at 16; Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, 
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835884. 
44 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975) (arguing for the “[p]roper appreciation of the importance of 
the equality principle in the First Amendment”). 
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identity, which seems to many uncomfortably similar to viewpoint dis-
crimination.45 
 The main reaction of those defending Kasky’s claim was, naturally, 
to dispute that there was any viewpoint discrimination.46 Some re-
sponses cast the matter as one of David confronting Goliath, so that it 
was not unfair for the little guy to go more heavily armed.47 Substantive 
equality required a check on the ability of large corporations to domi-
nate discourse as against individual consumers, who are in a much 
worse position to determine the actual facts.48 The businesses on Nike’s 
side therefore often framed the issue as one of organized interest 
groups, distinct from consumers, attacking businesses.49 The image of 
                                                                                                                      
45 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twi-
light Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 67, 123–25 (2007) (arguing that 
the differential treatment of commercial speakers and their critics constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination). 
46 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality (unpublished article, on file 
with author). 
47 See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Why the ACLU Was Wrong About Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 41 Tulsa 
L. Rev. 715, 731 (2006). Piety argues that: 
[I]t seems to stretch credulity to argue imbalance in the context of a multi-
billion dollar corporation, which spends enormous sums on communications 
with the public where no other speaker spends anything approaching the 
same amount of money in counter speech. Moreover, because of these ex-
penditures, Nike has far more access to speech outlets and media than any of 
its adversaries, except perhaps columnists like Bob Herbert. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corpo-
rate Speech and the First Amendment, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1277, 1288–89 (2004) (discuss-
ing this reaction). 
48 James Boyle argues that courts and general American ideology have historically 
been more sympathetic to disparities in information than disparities in other resources, 
and thus willing to regulate the informational aspects of transactions: 
When we are analyzing SEC mandated disclosure statements or the extent of 
a tort law duty to warn of the dangerous tendencies in a product, there is 
more of a willingness to look at outcomes and results rather than formally 
equal access—to take into account the actual education level, social class, and 
native language of those who are the targets of the warnings, rather than con-
clusively assuming a formal equality. 
James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the 
Information Society 181 (1996); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commer-
cial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 24–25 (2000) (arguing that commercial speech has only 
received constitutional protection when it occurs between “strangers who can be conceived 
as independent and rational”; when one party is dependent on the other in some way, the 
court treats the speech as part of the easily regulable commercial transaction). 
49 See, e.g., Brief of the Ass’n of Nat’l Adver., supra note 34, at 5–6; Brief Amici Curiae 
of Forty Leading Newspapers, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 13–14, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 
(No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835613 [hereinafter Brief of Forty Leading Newspapers]. 
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the interest group is one of informed, perhaps overinformed and bi-
ased, individuals banding together; politically correct Goliath versus 
business Goliath (or even small business David).50 Unlike blank-slate 
consumers, interest group members’ preferences seem unlikely to 
change because of advertising, so it may seem unfair of them to com-
plain about false advertising. That knocks out the substantive equality 
claim and brings us back to viewpoint discrimination. 
 But it’s a little peculiar to call the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction viewpoint discrimination, which is a term usually applied to 
the suppression of a particular message.51 Commercial actors may still 
tout their wares, subject only to the requirement that their speech not 
be false or misleading.52 In other words, Nike still gets to fight, and by 
the same rules as its competitors in the market. Moreover, private 
speakers were free to defend Nike’s practices and criticize the labor 
protestors, subject only to defamation law. So there was some equality 
on the battlefield even in Nike’s terms. 
 There are other instances in which the government goes around 
tying one metaphorical combatant’s hand behind its metaphorical 
back. For example, the FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule,53 promulgated 
pursuant to the 1994 Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Pre-
vention Act,54 requires many disclosures by telemarketers about their 
identities and intentions.55 On the other hand, recipients can lie, 
abuse, and taunt the telemarketers at will, as many a humorist has 
noted.56 More seriously, some states have additional “no rebuttal” laws 
requiring telemarketers to discontinue a call if at any point the cus-
tomer gives a negative response to the offer.57 Further persuasion is not 
allowed, which seems to raise serious First Amendment concerns if the 
underlying speech is truthful and nonmisleading. Yet it is difficult to 
think of the telemarketing law as allowing one side to fight freestyle 
                                                                                                                      
50 See, e.g., Brief of Forty Leading Newspapers, supra note 49, at 13–14. 
51 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 
(1995). 
52 E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976). 
53 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.1–.9 (2009). 
54 15 U.S.C. § 610.2 (2006). 
55 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.3. 
56 See, e.g., Business Humorist: Telemarketers, http://www.comedytime.tv/view_video. 
php?viewkey=eda77f3638aea858421e (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
57 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-670(b)(4) (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.46953(3) 
(LexisNexis 2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-603(c) (2000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.611(1)(d) 
(2007); Wash Rev. Code Ann. § 19.158.110(1)(b) (West 2007). 
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and requiring the other to comply with Marquis of Queensberry rules, 
because the sides are simply too different to justify the comparison. 
 Similarly, the distinction in First Amendment defamation law be-
tween public figures and private figures inherently contemplates the 
application of different standards to different speakers, at least if they 
are in direct conflict. Imagine a case in which a public figure and a pri-
vate figure defame one another; the public figure may be subject to 
liability for negligence,58 whereas the private figure can only be liable if 
the public figure can show actual malice by clear and convincing evi-
dence.59 The U.S. Supreme Court’s justification for this distinction be-
gan with the argument that public figures are differently situated by 
virtue of their public status: they have more access to the media and a 
greater ability to fight back without the aid of law.60 In the language of 
equal protection law, the parties are not similarly situated, and equality 
does not require treating unlikes alike.61 
 False advertising claims by competitors or consumers pose very 
different circumstances than standard public figure defamation cases. 
The reasons for making it harder for public figures to win defamation 
cases than private figures—that they can fight back in the media more 
easily and that they voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye—are 
generally true of both sides in a Lanham Act case involving two busi-
nesses.62 And in a consumer action, self-defense capability and volun-
tary exposure are more likely to be characteristics of a defendant trying 
to avoid liability for an allegedly false claim and not of the plaintiff try-
ing to establish falsity. Applying public figure standards to Lanham Act 
cases or consumer protection cases detaches the category from its justi-
fication. 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
59 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
60 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. The Court in Gertz stated that: 
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using available op-
portunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize 
its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually en-
joy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication 
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements 
than private individuals normally enjoy. 
Id. 
61 The debate then shifts to what counts as likeness, or to equality as antisubordina-
tion; proponents of increased protection for commercial speech understandably rely more 
on making commercial speech seem like noncommercial speech than on claiming that 
corporate interests are subject to pervasive discrimination and oppression. 
62 See, e.g., Truck Components, Inc. v. K-H Corp., 776 F. Supp. 405, 407–08 (N.D. Ill. 
1991). 
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 More generally, there is a fundamental difficulty with the fisticuffs 
metaphor: Advertising law allows many different actors to challenge an 
ad. Inequality is therefore either absent or not meaningful. In the case 
involving a dispute between two businesses, the Lanham Act requires 
both sides to refrain from foul blows under pain of strict liability for 
falsehood, so there’s no unfairness at all. This insight accounts for the 
convoluted reasoning in the one case that extensively analyzed the 
proper constitutional standard to be applied to Lanham Act product 
disparagement claims by competitors, U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of 
Greater Philadelphia, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in 1990.63 The parties in the case engaged in a comparative ad-
vertising war over their respective health insurance offerings, including 
ads that implied that one side’s poor services led to an insured’s 
death.64 Standard defamation law would treat both parties as public 
figures, thus imposing an actual malice requirement before either 
one’s false statements could give rise to liability.65 The Third Circuit, 
however, reasoned that applying the general defamation rule wouldn’t 
make sense in the context of false commercial advertising.66 Both par-
ties were commercial speakers, interacting in the market in order to 
take business from one another;67 both were subject to the Lanham 
Act, and imposing liability based on falsity alone was consistent with the 
constitutional status of commercial speech. Adding an actual malice 
requirement, by contrast, would unravel the Lanham Act scheme, be-
cause the facts of the case were entirely typical for commercial speech 
battles between competitors.68 
                                                                                                                      
63 See 898 F.2d 914, 927–39 (3d Cir. 1990). 
64 See id. at 918–19. 
65 See id. at 938–39. 
66 See id. at 939. 
67 The court distinguished a previous case, Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, where a 
business sued a television station for defamation based on the station’s consumer report-
ing. See Blue Cross, 898 F.2d at 938 n.29 (citing Steaks Unlimited, 623 F.2d 264, at 266–68 (3d 
Cir. 1980)). The Steaks Unlimited court found that the business was a public figure for pur-
poses of its lawsuit and thus needed to show actual malice. 623 F.2d at 272. The Blue Cross 
court distinguished the business-versus-reporter scenario from the business-versus-business 
situation, indicating that reporters need heightened First Amendment protection. 898 
F.2d at 938 n.29. 
68 See Blue Cross, 898 F.3d at 939. The court in Blue Cross stated that: 
The express analysis in Gertz is not helpful in the context of a comparative ad-
vertising war. Most products can be linked to a public issue. And most adver-
tisers—including both claimants here—seek out the media. Thus, it will al-
ways be true that such advertisers have voluntarily placed themselves in the 
public eye. It will be equally true that such advertisers have access to the me-
dia. Therefore, under the Gertz rationale, speech of public concern that im-
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 Likewise, inequality can be an unhelpful concept in describing a 
regulator’s role. The FTC, state attorneys general, and similar govern-
ment actors are referees—cousins to that familiar government agent, 
the night watchman.69 If First Amendment doctrine requires applica-
tion of a defamation standard to false advertising claims in the name of 
equality, it will disrupt other coherent regulatory schemes that are al-
ready equal; the referee will go home, and the rules of the game be-
tween competitors will change drastically.70 
 The answer might be to require only consumers to show fault be-
cause it is only in the consumer lawsuit situation that the Marquis of 
Queensberry problem arises. But such a rule would be even more bi-
zarre. The core justification for state regulation and competitor lawsuits 
is to protect consumers from harm.71 If consumers themselves can only 
stop deliberate or negligent falsehood, what justification do others— 
who have interests that will never quite align with consumers’—have for 
suppressing nonnegligent speech? False advertising, much more than 
defamation law, is everybody’s business. 
 Another way of looking at the equality argument is that there is a 
second symmetry that is key to Nike’s argument from fairness: nice 
                                                                                                                      
plicates corporate advertisers—i.e., typical comparative advertising—will al-
ways be insulated behind the actual malice standard. 
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Procter & Gamble Co., 242 F.3d at 556 (reaching the 
same conclusion with regard to Lanham Act and trade libel claims). 
69See, e.g., Alex W. Cannon, Regulating AdWords: Consumer Protection in a Market Where the 
Commodity Is Speech, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 291, 313 (2009). Cannon asserts that: 
FTC regulation is intended to place businesses on a somewhat equal footing 
when it comes to their ability to propose commercial transactions; it prevents 
a dominant firm from misleading consumers as to a competitor’s product, an 
act that may harm competition by preventing or discouraging new market en-
try. It also places businesses on level ground, because once an FTC regulation 
is in place, it prohibits businesses from falling below the FTC standard, there-
by protecting the communications medium itself. 
Id. 
70 Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected an egg industry 
group’s attempt to claim Sullivan-level protection for itself when it, on behalf of its mem-
bers, entered the debate about the health risks and benefits of eggs. See Nat’l Comm’n on 
Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting organization’s analogy 
between its statements about the nutritional and health benefits of eggs and defamatory 
statements about a public official on the ground that the former was commercial speech). 
71 In the competitor’s case, it’s the deception of consumers that harms the competitor 
by taking away its business. One can also fruitfully conceive of this as a distinct injury to 
the competitor, one that would not be redressed merely by redressing the consumer harm, 
but that separate harm still depends on a consumer being deceived and changing his or 
her behavior as a result. 
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things versus nasty things. The argument is that, if consumers can at-
tack Nike, Nike must be allowed to defend itself with non-defamatory 
speech using the same standards. This symmetry is vitally important to 
the other two regulatory schemes because the usual false advertising 
scenario involves someone challenging nice things that the advertiser 
says about itself. The FTC will essentially never get involved if there is a 
specific target of negative speech that can take care of itself (sometimes 
with a Lanham Act lawsuit), and competitor suits are regularly about 
positive superiority claims.72 There was a point at which commentators 
thought that perhaps the First Amendment posed different constraints 
on false self-aggrandizement than on false disparagement when it came 
to competitor-on-competitor suits,73 but courts never showed much in-
                                                                                                                      
72 The general factors underlying FTC exercise of discretion are set forth at Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (1983), appended to In re Cliffdale, 
Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (F.T.C. Mar. 23, 1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm, and the FTC now generally encourages comparative ad-
vertising. See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b) (2009); see also Barry J. Cutler, The Criminalization of Con-
sumer Protection—A Brave New World for Defense Counsel, 22 Antitrust 61, 61 (2007). Cutler 
argues that: 
Playing “the cop on the beat” to maintain high standards among national ad-
vertisers largely has given way to efforts at recovering money for defrauded 
consumers and addressing online security and privacy breaches. One sees 
fewer household names in advertising and other cases brought to maintain 
fair competition, but more “operations,” ”projects,” and ”sweeps” that pro-
duce larger numbers of cases of lesser competitive significance—the compa-
nies and individuals bound by permanent injunctions being quickly replaced 
by new actors using similar practices. 
Id. 
73 J. Thomas McCarthy summarized the rationale that might have justified the devel-
opment of two sub-branches of Lanham Act false advertising: 
The distinction is that while [traditional] false advertising laws prohibit cer-
tain false claims about one’s own goods or services, product disparagement 
law prohibits certain false claims about another’s goods or services. The dis-
tinction is more than one of form. The law has traditionally treated the two 
kinds of commercial false statements very differently, with two separate sets of 
laws governed by different rules. 
 . . . While constitutional free speech principles have had relatively little 
impact upon false advertising law, they have a considerably greater impact on 
product disparagement law. One explanation for the distinction is that free 
speech principles have relatively little to do with the determination of the 
truth or falsity of allegedly misleading advertising claims about a company’s 
own goods and services because who should know better than the advertiser 
as to what is true and false about its own products? 
 On the other hand, product disparagement claims concern a publication 
critical of another person’s or corporation’s goods and services. Likely target 
defendants include not only competitors, but media, business, and academic 
commentators. The content of such messages are likely to be of public con-
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terest, preferring to treat all falsity the same way under the Lanham 
Act.74 This makes sense because where there is competition, self-
aggrandizement shades readily into other-disparagement— “buy our 
product because it’s safe” is not much different from “buy our product 
because it’s safer than the alternatives” or “buy our product because the 
alternatives are unsafe.” Nike’s attempt to speak positively about itself 
subject only to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan constraints was therefore a 
dagger aimed at the heart of false advertising law generally. 
 Given this complicated and interlocking structure, the superficial 
appeal of the symmetry argument must be rejected. When government 
acts as a regulator—as with the FTC—or allows consumers to act as 
regulators—by using the courts—it is simply inappropriate to frame the 
issue as one of treating likes alike. Equality claims always require us to 
ask the criteria on which equality is being judged: being on opposing 
sides of a particular argument is not always enough to constitute equal-
ity, even if it would be sufficient in some circumstances. Indeed, the 
equality argument, as Kenneth Karst developed it, was based on the 
idea that the government cannot selectively regulate less than the 
amount of speech it could constitutionally regulate—it cannot ban only 
racially inflammatory fighting words75 or ban use of a U.S. Army uni-
form only in plays that criticize the government,76 even if it can ban all 
fighting words or all theatrical uses of actual Army uniforms.77 Here, as 
                                                                                                                      
cern and interest. These are all good reasons for the First Amendment’s con-
cern for providing breathing space for the exercise of free speech. 
 The issue facing the federal courts is whether the 1989 federalization of 
the tort of product disparagement in section 43(a) will mean the incorpora-
tion of the common law elements of the product disparagement tort such as 
intent and a detailed proof of special damages or, on the other hand, adop-
tion of the false advertising principles of section 43(a), which do not require 
such elements. 
J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake, Law & 
Contemp. Probs., Spring 1996, at 72–73 (footnotes omitted); cf. Steven Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1212, 1269 & n.330 (1983) (suggesting that critical comparative advertising 
ought to be given more leeway than standard positive advertising claims, including a sci-
enter requirement for product disparagement, because most advertising is positive and 
thus the marketplace of ideas is unbalanced in favor of positive claims). 
74 See, e.g., Blue Cross, 898 F.2d at 937 (disparagement claims against competitor’s ads 
not subject to heightened standards because the alleged disparagement occurred in purely 
commercial speech). 
75 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392. 
76 Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970). 
77 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth Karst’s Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 37, 39 (2008). Stone argues that: 
 
1474 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1457 
long as there is a separate commercial speech doctrine, the govern-
ment can ban all false and misleading commercial speech, which is 
what advertising law purports to do;78 the fact that this restricts com-
mercial speakers more than their noncommercial critics is central to 
the entire structure of commercial speech doctrine.79 
 As long as we have a commercial speech doctrine at all, that is, the 
inequality argument will be available and cannot be limited to cases in 
which there is an active public policy dispute connected to a corporate 
speaker. Law is full of contradictions that somehow remain stable, but 
courts tend to want to make the law in any particular field coherent.80 
                                                                                                                      
[T]he core of the equality claim under the First Amendment is one of under-
inclusion. That is, the equality claim arises when the government has suffi-
cient justification to restrict the individual’s speech under traditional First 
Amendment analysis, but the government creates a separate and distinct 
equality issue if it decides voluntarily to restrict less speech than it is constitu-
tionally entitled to restrict. That is, by allowing more speech than it is consti-
tutionally required to allow, the government creates an inequality that . . . 
must be independently justified. 
Id. 
78 This description is oversimplified. Some states’ consumer protection laws exclude 
various classes of businesses, such as insurance, and some Lanham Act caselaw indicates 
that a sufficiently comprehensive regulatory scheme, such as the FDA regulations, pre-
empts application of the Lanham Act to certain subject matters. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., 
Com. Law § 13-104 (LexisNexus 2005); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01(A) (West 2008); 
Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 306 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996) (barring a Lanham Act claim when the FDA had not yet approved a competi-
tor’s product). But the rationale for disallowing a claim under those laws is always that 
some other regulatory entity is better suited to identify and deter falsity as part of adminis-
tering a comprehensive regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Summit Tech., Inc., 922 F. Supp. at 306 
(stating that the Lanham Act cause of action would usurp the FDA’s discretionary role to 
interpret its own regulations) (citing Fender v. Medtronic, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. 
Cal. 1995)). Thus, even false and misleading commercial speech outside the specific cov-
erage of the laws discussed in the text is always banned, at least in theory. One might con-
struct a First Amendment argument that the regulatory entity has to be identical in all 
similar cases, but—as indicated by the failure of Nike’s argument in Kasky that private 
plaintiffs were inappropriate enforcers—that is not a mainstream First Amendment argu-
ment presently. (And, of course, this argument would also require the proponent to ad-
dress the claim that pervasively regulated fields like insurance and prescription drugs are 
relevantly different from less-regulated fields.) 
79 Karst thought that commercial speech doctrine, as it had begun to develop when he 
first wrote, was in tension with the equality principle he identified. See Karst, supra note 44, 
at 34–35. He did, however, suggest that regulating false commercial advertising was appro-
priate, implicitly recognizing that some special treatment for advertising is justified. See id. 
at 34 n.75. 
80 Harry Kalven “celebrated the evolution of First Amendment doctrine over the 
course of the twentieth century as an example of the law working itself pure.” Owen M. 
Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 6 (1996) (discussing Harry Kalven, A Worthy Tradi-
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Success for Nike in defining the relevant field as noncommercial First 
Amendment law would therefore have risked destabilizing all regula-
tion of the truth of commercial claims. 
III. Fairness as Symmetry: Competition Under the Lanham Act 
 The Lanham Act, in its way, acted as a kind of First Amendment 
backstop. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky arguably ended up being dismissed as im-
providently granted because the U.S. Supreme Court didn’t want to 
affirm—oral argument was far from favorable to Kasky81—but reversing 
posed obvious threats to other regulatory regimes that did not have 
equality problems. These regimes prominently included the Lanham 
Act and the FTC Act. 
 The Lanham Act is particularly significant here because, as the 
primary federal law allowing nongovernment actors to regulate com-
mercial entities’ speech, it plays a substantial role in ordering American 
economic life. Moreover, the Lanham Act uses language to protect 
trademarks that is virtually identical to its false advertising provisions.82 
Yet trademarks are usually popular with the same people who distrust 
consumer class actions and government advertising regulation.83 
Trademark infringement, however, is just a specific type of false adver-
tising: infringement causes consumer deception about the source or 
                                                                                                                      
tion: Freedom of Speech in America (1987)). On the drive to work the law pure, see 
Judge Frank’s concurring opinion in Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590–91 (2d Cir. 1952). 
81 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 40–42, 52–54, 58–61. 
82 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) bars the use in commerce of “any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact” which either 
(A) “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive” consumers “as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of [the parties] . . . , or as to the origin, sponsorship, 
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities” (the trademark provi-
sion) or (B) “in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, charac-
teristics, qualities, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities” 
(the false advertising provision). Thus, the language barring falsity and misleading repre-
sentation is the same in the statute, and courts have interpreted both provisions to require 
a showing of likely deception, though there are some significant differences in the details 
of the doctrine. See, e.g., Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 
1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that in the trademark context, the “ultimate question 
remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products or services 
offered by the parties are affiliated in some way”); Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup 
Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965) (noting that in the commercial advertising context, 
in order to receive equitable relief, only a likelihood of deception must be shown). 
83 Businesses have substantial self-interest in making it difficult for consumers and the 
government to sue them for false advertising, but much more mixed incentives as to ex-
pansive trademark law because businesses themselves often benefit from making trade-
mark claims. 
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sponsorship of particular goods, supposedly leading consumers to 
make mistaken decisions about what to buy—though trademark law has 
essentially abandoned any requirement that a trademark owner show 
any actual effect on a purchasing decision.84 
 If libel-like First Amendment protections were applied to false ad-
vertising claims, the application of these protections to trademark law 
would naturally seem to follow. Even conceding that protecting con-
sumers against deception as to the source of a good or service is a com-
pelling government interest,85 many of trademark law’s core presump-
tions would disappear if the field were constitutionalized—and 
trademark dilution, a concept much beloved of many businesses, might 
disappear entirely.86 Dilution posits that nonconfusing uses of a trade-
mark, or uses of a symbol too similar to a trademark, can slowly diminish 
the value of the trademark by diffusing or tarnishing the positive asso-
ciations generated by the trademark.87 Trademark and false advertising 
lawsuits allow businesses to regulate relations between one another with 
government and consumers playing bit parts; symmetry seems inherent 
in the enterprise. As a result, though businesses that sell creative works 
have argued for First Amendment limits on trademark as applied to de-
fendants selling movies and music,88 there has been no significant pres-
                                                                                                                      
84 See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1024 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding 
false endorsement liability established by showing likely confusion without requiring any 
showing of effect on purchasing decisions). 
85 This may not be the case if the goods or services are of equal quality or if the mark is 
used on noncompeting goods. See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory 
of Harm, 95 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348746. It is interesting to compare Judge Kozinski’s reasoning in 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002), in which he describes 
trademark infringement as “essentially a fraud on the consuming public” and thus enjoin-
able without concern for the First Amendment, with his analysis in Alex Kozinski & Stuart 
Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 653 (1990), in which he and 
his coauthor condemn most advertising regulation for insufficient attention to the strict 
requirements of proof for common-law fraud. 
86 See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. 
Rev. 381, 388 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 
S.C. L. Rev. 737, 738–39 (2007). 
87 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive 
Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507 (2008) (explaining and criticizing dilution theory). 
88 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906–07 (protecting song “Barbie Girl” against trademark in-
fringement and dilution accusations by makers of the doll, Barbie); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 
875 F.2d 994, 1001, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989) (protecting movie title Ginger & Fred against 
trademark infringement claim by the performer Ginger Rogers). 
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sure from the business community to apply First Amendment doctrines 
to the Lanham Act as a whole.89 
 Is there any role for symmetry in imposing First Amendment con-
straints on regulations of commercial speech? Where they actually dis-
advantage particular groups systematically, perhaps. Some asymmetries 
in trademark law are very much like the asymmetries posited by Nike’s 
proponents in Kasky: trademark owners get to take advantage of every 
non-false sales pitch possible, including appeals to our emotions and 
the seductive likability of the familiar.90 But dilution protection, particu-
larly protection against tarnishment, means that competitors—and 
sometimes critics—cannot appeal to our negative emotions, and cannot 
use over-familiarity, disgust, or other emotions to get us to abandon a 
brand.91 To the extent that dilution actually does force competitors to 
fight on different terms, it might be subject to the viewpoint discrimi-
nation/Marquis of Queensberry objection.92 
 There is an obvious response to such a claim: to the extent that 
each trademark owner is entitled to dilution protection, then everyone 
is arguably playing by the same rules. Current federal dilution law, 
however, protects only “famous” marks (and state laws generally also 
                                                                                                                      
89 Speculatively, another possible reason the Lanham Act seems such a poor target for 
wholesale reformation via the First Amendment might be lingering uncertainty about the 
rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan outside its application to public officials. Perhaps 
there is simply less to worry about when the government, in the form of the courts, aids a 
private entity to suppress the speech of another private entity pursuant to a facially view-
point neutral law governing speech. Relatedly, perhaps speech about consumer goods such 
as razors and antacids (two frequent flyers in the Lanham Act airspace) is truly not as im-
portant to democratic discourse as the categories of speech involved in defamation cases. 
90 See generally Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1227 (2008) (arguing that trademark law should be updated to reflect 
the role of emotion on consumers’ decisions). 
91 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that 
competitor’s use of John Deere’s deer trademark, by which the deer was made to look 
weak and frightened, was actionable tarnishment). See generally Katya Assaf, The Dilution of 
Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1 (2008) (offering  an analysis of the way in 
which dilution protection treats trademarks better than other competing cultural symbols 
and thus promotes the continued commercialization of culture and society). 
92 See Tushnet, supra note 87, at 561. There I argue that: 
[T]he aim of dilution law . . . [is] to allow trademark owners to stabilize the 
meaning of a mark. . . . In general, First Amendment doctrine favors robust 
competition in the marketplace of ideas rather than simplification that makes 
certain already-successful ideas easier to understand. Dilution is a doctrine 
that favors meanings approved by established producers above meanings of-
fered by challengers. It is anticompetitive, and to the extent that truthful 
commercial speech promotes democratic values, antidemocratic. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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have some sort of heightened distinctiveness requirement).93 Once 
again, we are forced to examine equality more closely and ask whether 
the differences between famous and nonfamous marks are sufficient to 
justify giving famous marks distinct treatment, even if that means that 
the owner of a famous mark can tarnish a nonfamous mark and the 
owner of the nonfamous mark cannot respond in kind.94 I do not wish 
to argue that First Amendment equality principles make dilution pro-
tection unconstitutional; I have argued elsewhere that dilution is un-
constitutional on other grounds.95 The point is that the superficial ap-
peal of equality arguments in the commercial speech context dissolves 
on closer examination. Commercial speech regulation will remain a 
difficult problem as long as there is a commercial speech doctrine. 
Conclusion 
 The argument from fairness failed for Nike as a commercial 
speaker because asymmetry does not properly describe the way in 
which Nike is subject to regulation of the truthfulness of its speech. 
More broadly, if commercial speech is to be treated differently from 
noncommercial speech, then the state will inevitably treat commercial 
speakers differently, producing the apparent asymmetry seen in Nike, Inc. 
v. Kasky. Too narrow a focus on the particular dispute in Kasky— 
whether Marc Kasky could sue based on representations Nike made 
about labor conditions at its subcontractors’ plants in response to a 
campaign to draw public attention to those conditions—would prevent 
us from understanding the way in which the equality argument fits into 
(or destabilizes) the overall architecture of the First Amendment.96 
                                                                                                                      
93 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.151 (West 2008); 765 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. Ann. 1036/65 (West 2001). 
94 Numerous commentators, both proponents and opponents of dilution, have con-
cluded that limiting dilution protection to famous marks is inconsistent with the basic 
premises of dilution law because fame and vulnerability to dissipation of distinctiveness are 
not correlated and may in fact be inversely correlated. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, A Defense of 
the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 
1143, 1161 (2006) (deeming this an “irony” of the law); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. 
Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 98, 100 (2006) 
(pointing out the disconnect between the theory of dilution and the fame requirement); 
Maureen Morrin et al., Determinants of Trademark Dilution, 33 J. Consumer Res. 248, 253 
(2006) (dilution proponent); Tushnet, supra note 87, at 562 (dilution critic). 
95 See Tushnet, supra note 87, at 554–58. 
96 Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1181, 1202–03 (1988) (arguing for analyzing First Amendment problems with 
an eye towards the way in which resolution of a particular case affects the general structure 
of the doctrine). 
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 Some may conclude that the rejection of the Marquis of Queens-
berry argument necessary to sustain commercial speech doctrine is yet 
another reason that the doctrine should be abandoned. My own com-
mitments, however, lead me to support the continued vitality of false 
advertising law in its varied forms. Of course the result is line-drawing 
and hard cases; it could hardly be otherwise. Nonetheless, regulation of 
false and misleading commercial speech plays a vital role in our free 
market economy. 
 Government agencies, such as the FTC, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, and the FDA, engage in direct government regu-
lation of speech using rulemaking and enforcement actions. But the 
courts that enforce the Lanham Act and consumer protection laws such 
as the one considered in Kasky are also regulators, setting the terms on 
which efforts to influence consumers occur. For constitutional pur-
poses, as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established, there is generally no 
difference between courts and agencies as regulators. Thus, without a 
justification to treat them differently, invalidating judicial regulation via 
consumer protection laws will throw into doubt these other bodies of 
law. And that in itself is a reason to apply the general rule—false com-
mercial speech is subject to injunction and, sometimes, to damages—to 
consumer actions even when that makes an individual case seem unfair 
to the corporate advertiser. 
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